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FIFRA PREEMPTION OF STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIMS AFTER CIPOLLONE v. LIGGETT GROUP, INC.
R. David Allnutt
Abstract: In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed a narrow
application of the federal preemption doctrine where preemption would prevent a state from
exercising its police powers through the common law. Cipollone marks the latest in a line of
Supreme Court decisions requiring courts to employ a presumption against preemption if
congressional intent to preempt is not clear. Nevertheless, recent circuit court decisions have
held that FIFRA preempts state common law claims against pesticide manufacturers. This
Comment concludes that courts continuing to hold FIFRA preemptive of state common law
both misinterpret congressional intent and misapply Cipollone.
Ed was a farmer. Like most farmers, he regularly applied pesticides to
his crops. Fearing the possible health effects of a certain pesticide, Ed
read its warning label carefully. He avoided prolonged inhalation of the
pesticide's fumes because the label warned of the potential for short-term
headaches. He was relieved that the label mentioned no possibility of
cancer or other chronic diseases resulting from long-term exposure. He
therefore used the pesticide year after year, always following the
instructions and avoiding prolonged inhalation.
Several years passed, and Ed developed an inoperable brain tumor.
His doctor told him he had seen similar tumors quite frequently in
farmers who, over many years, inhaled small quantities of the same
pesticide. Angry that the pesticide's label made no mention of
catastrophic long-term effects and eager to provide compensation for his
family, Ed visited a lawyer to propose suing the pesticide's
manufacturer. Imagine Ed's surprise when his attorney told him that a
suit against the manufacturer was doomed to fail. By choosing to
regulate pesticide labeling, Congress had prevented the state in which Ed
lived from requiring pesticide manufacturers to compensate the victims
of their products. "Congress said that?" Ed asked incredulously. "Well,
not exactly... ," the lawyer replied.
Although Ed's case is hypothetical, plaintiffs increasingly face exactly
this situation as they seek state law damages for injuries caused by
pesticides. The source of confusion is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act' (FIFRA), a 46-year-old pesticide labeling and
registration statute. A growing number of courts have accepted
1. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 135-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1993).
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manufacturers' arguments that FIFRA preempts state common law
claims for damages caused by pesticides. This Comment explores the
interplay between FIFRA and the federal preemption doctrine. Part I
examines the origins and interpretations of the preemption doctrine
before briefly surveying FIFRA's history, language, and judicial
treatment. Part II analyzes judicial application of the preemption
doctrine in pesticide labeling cases. The Comment concludes that lower
courts accepting the preemption defense in FIFRA cases misapply the
Supreme Court's current understanding of the preemption doctrine and
misinterpret congressional intent.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND FIFRA: AN
OVERVIEW
Lower courts denying relief to plaintiffs claiming pesticide-related
damages have relied on the perceived preemptive force of FIFRA. As
with many doctrines originating in the U.S. Constitution, judicial
treatment of the preemption doctrine generally, and of FIFRA
preemption specifically, has varied.
A. Federal Preemption Before and After Cipollone
Throughout its history, the preemption doctrine has undergone a series
of transformations reflecting the fluctuating ideologies of the Supreme
Court. The presumptions that have signaled these transformations
illuminate the Court's preemption philosophy at each phase. The
plurality opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.2 is the most recent
illustration of the Court's preemption views.
1. Preemption Doctrine: Historical Judicial Treatment
At least since McCulloch v. Maryland,' the Supreme Court has held
that the Constitution's Supremacy Clause4 grants Congress the power to
2. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (invalidating a Maryland tax on the Bank of the United States).
4. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land
... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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displace or "preempt" conflicting state and local regulations.5 Over time,
the Court's willingness to employ the doctrine to strike down state rules
has varied. The shifting doctrinal tools used to determine congressional
intent illustrate the evolving judicial attitude toward federal preemption.
a. The Categories of Preemption and the Importance of
Congressional Intent
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal law may preempt state
regulations in three analytically distinct situations. In each situation, the
Court's predominant concern is Congress's intent to preempt,6 and
questions of statutory construction often dominate as the Court struggles
to determine whether Congress intended the federal statute to preempt
state law.7
First, the Supreme Court will invalidate any state regulation that
Congress has expressed an intent to preempt through explicit statutory
language. Second, absent express congressional intent, federal law will
still preempt state regulations that "conflict in fact" with the federal
scheme.9 Finally, the Court has held that states are powerless to regulate
in fields in which federal law is so pervasive that Congress has left no
room for the states to act." None of these categories, however, is
capable of complete analytic autonomy, and, in practice, courts often
blur boundaries or merge classifications."
5. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 9.1-9.4
(4th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-25 to 6-27 (2d ed.
1988).
6. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) ("[t]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96,
103 (1963)).
7. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-25, at 479.
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977). This Comment refers to
this form of preemption as "express preemption."
9. See, e.g., Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1 (1986); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
De ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159-60 (1982); This Comment refers to this form of preemption as
"conflict-preemption"
10. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). This Comment refers to this form of preemption
as "occupation-preemption." For the sake of clarity, this Comment treats conflict- and occupation-
preemption as subcategories of "implied preemption."
11. See TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 6-26, 6-27 (identifying two categories and noting the difficulties
in air-tight categorization); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 70-71 (1988) (identifying four categories of preemption and noting the
inconsistent application of these categories in any given case).
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b. Presumptions: Shifting Aids in Determining Congressional Intent
The Court analyzes issues in each of the three categories with the aid
of presumptions designed to determine Congress's intent to preempt.
The rapid growth of the federal regulatory state in this century has
increased frictions between federal and state legislative objectives.'
2
This friction has accelerated calls for judicial application of the
preemption doctrine, and the Supreme Court has responded by
employing an evolving series of presumptions. These presumptions have
expanded or contracted the preemption doctrine to conform it to the
Court's vacillating ideological views." For instance, during the 1920s
and 1930s, the Supreme Court greatly restricted the previously expansive
preemption doctrine'4 by erecting a presumption in favor of state
regulation. Plaintiffs could rebut this presumption only by a clear
demonstration of actual conflict between federal and state laws or
congressional intent to occupy the field.' In contrast, the New Deal and
Warren Courts erected several presumptions in favor of federal
preemption. These Courts invalidated state laws without any showing of
explicit congressional intent to occupy the field or actual conflict
between the state and federal regulatory schemes.'6
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has once again employed
presumptions that demonstrate reluctance to infer federal preemption.' 7
The Court commonly refers to this reluctance as a presumption that
Congress did not intend to displace state law.'8 The Court has been
especially hesitant to find preemption if the federal regulation threatens a
state's ability to exercise its police powers or to apply its common law.
12. See generally THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones & Bruce Collins eds., 1983).
13. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 623 (1975).
14. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (broadly cons-xuing a federal licensing
statute to find it preemptive of New York's ferry monopoly statute). The expansive view of
preemption held forth into this century. See Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. v. Vamville Furniture
Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (holding that any federal legislation in a field preempts all state
legislation in that field, whether coinciding or conflicting).
15. See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933); see also Bratton, supra note 13, at 627.
16. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1959);
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
17. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-25, at 479; Bratton, supra note 13, at 649 (noting that early
Burger Court decisions showed a renewed emphasis on the state-directed doctrine).
18. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981).
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i. Presumption Against Preemption: The Police Power
Modem cases indicate that the presumption against preemption is
even more difficult to rebut where preemption would displace the state in
its role as protector of health and safety. The Court has often noted that
federal legislation will not supersede the historic police powers of the
states unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.19 By
emphasizing the special interests of a state in protecting the health and
safety of its citizens, the Court has preserved a variety of state
regulations in the face of preemption challenges."
ii. Presumption Against Preemption: The Common Law
The vast majority of federal preemption cases involve claims that the
federal statute displaces state positive law.21 It is settled, however, that
Congress may also preempt state common law claims.' Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has been even less likely to find preemption of state
common law claims than it has been to find displacement of states'
positive enactments.23
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.24 illustrates the Court's reluctance to
preempt state common law. The Silkwood Court acknowledged that it
recently had held the Atomic Energy Act to preempt any state regulation
19. E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947) (dictum).
20. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1960)
(upholding local pollution controls); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1939)
(upholding state truck safety requirements); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
316 (1981); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
generally NOWAK, supra note 5, § 9.3, at 313.
21. See Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A. Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in Products
Liability Cases-Federalism in the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV. 603, 607 (1987).
22. Congress has enacted a variety of statutes containing language explicitly preempting state
common law claims. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 301(a)-(b) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1993); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West
1985). The Supreme Court occasionally has struck down state common law claims without finding
explicit congressional design to do so. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,
494 (1987); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,244-45 (1959).
23. Some decisions have classified this reluctance as a corollary of the heightened presumption
against preemption of states' police powers. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529,
1542 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that state common law claims are within "the scope of state
superintendence"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
24. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). Silkwood involved a tort action for state law punitive damages against a
nuclear power plant that allegedly failed to follow safe operation practices. Id. at 243.
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of nuclear safety.' However, the Court distinguished a state's award of
common law punitive damages from enactment cof ordinary safety
regulations.26 The Court concluded that Congress had not preempted
punitive damage claims because there was no evidence that Congress
intended, without comment, to remove all means of judicial recourse for
those injured by illegal conduct.2 Although he believed that punitive
damages were preempted, Justice Blackmun drew even sharper
distinctions than the majority between traditional compensatory damage
actions and state regulations.2" According to Blackmun, courts must not
lightly infer conflict between a federal regulation and a state
compensatory damage action because the two pursue different goals.29
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.3" provided the most recent
opportunity for the Court to address the proper interpretation of
congressional intent in the context of claimed state common law
preemption. The plurality decision in Cipollone remains largely within
the preemption framework developed between McCulloch and Silkwood.
However, the decision also provides new insights into the
appropriateness of implied preemption analysis where Congress has
expressly addressed the preemption issue.
2. Federal Preemption Doctrine: Cipollone and Beyond
In 1983 Rose Cipollone and her husband sued three cigarette
manufacturers for the lung cancer Rose allegedly suffered as a result of
smoking the manufacturers' products. 3' The Cipollones based their
25. Id. at 249 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)).
26. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255-56.
27. Id. at 251. In other words, where preemption would foreclose El judicial remedies, the
majority would require a still stricter indicium of intent before holding a federal statute preemptive
of state common law duties. See also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,497 (1987)
(holding the Clean Water Act to preempt certain nuisance actions only after noting that such a
resolution of the case would "not leave respondents without a remedy"). See generally Edell &
Walters, supra note 21, at 607-13. This theme was undermined to some extent by Cipollone's
holding that the 1969 Act preempted certain failure to warn and misrepresentation claims. See infra
note 87.
28. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that compensatory damages
merely compensate the victim of a harm, while punitive damages encourage or discourage conduct).
29. Id. at 263-64. Under Blackmun's analysis, a power plant operator could continue operating
under federal statutes and pay tort damages for any subsequent resulting injuries. Id. at 264.
30. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
31. Id. at 2613-14.
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complaint on five separate New Jersey common law causes of action.32
The manufacturers raised preemption as an affirmative defense,
contending that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act3 3 (1965 Act) and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 196934 (1969 Act), shielded them from liability.35  Both of these
statutes contain sections captioned "Preemption" that purport to govern
continued state authority in the cigarette arena.3s
In a plurality opinion by Justice Stevens, four justices held that the
1965 Act did not preempt any of the Cipollones' five state law claims
37
but that the 1969 Act did expressly preempt aspects of two of these five
claims. 3' The plurality began its analysis by stating that congressional
intent to preempt is the "ultimate touchstone."39 The plurality then held
that the express language in section 5 of each Act governed the Acts'
preemptive scope and precluded any argument that the statutes impliedly
preempted state law actions.40  The plurality construed the express
language of both Acts in light of the "strong presumption" against
preemption of state police power regulations.4" The Court concluded that
the language of the 1965 Act did not preempt any state law damage
actions. 42 However, after examining the 1969 Act in light of the same
32. Id. at 2614. These causes of action were design defect, failure to warn, express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud. Id.
33. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1341
(West 1982 & Supp. 1993)).
34. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1341
(West 1982 & Supp. 1993)).
35. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
36. Section 5(b) of the 1965 Act reads:
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282, 283, replaced by 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 1982).
The 1969 Act modified this preemption section to read-
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 1982).
37. Cipollone, 112 S. CL at 2619.
38. Id. at 2625 (holding the Cipollones' failure to warn and misrepresentation claims preempted to
the extent that those claims relied on omissions in the manufacturers' advertising or promotions).
39. Id. at 2617 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
40. Id. at2618.
41. Id. at 2618,2621.
42. Id. at 2618-19. Three otherjustices joined this portion of the opinion. Id. at 2625 (Blackmun,
J. concurring).
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assumptions and presumption, the plurality concluded that the 1969
provision was much broader than that in the 1965 Act.43 The plurality
rejected the Cipollones' arguments that the amended language did not
cover any common law claims" and examined each claim individually to
determine whether the 1969 Act preempted it.45 This inquiry led the
Court to hold one of the Cipollones' misrepresentation claims and all of
their failure to warn theories expressly preempted.46
Two factions of the Court criticized the plurality for crafting a
bifurcated opinion which would frustrate lower courts.47  Justice
Blackmun wrote for three justices concurring in the plurality's discussion
of the applicable law, but dissenting in part because, in his view, neither
Act preempted state common law claims.4" Justice Blackmun would
have required a far clearer statement of congressional intent to preempt
than was evidenced by the 1969 Act.49
The Cipollone plurality decision reinforces three themes that the Court
had expressed in preemption decisions for over twenty years. First,
congressional intent remains the Court's primary consideration in
determining a statute's preemptive scope. 0 Second, the Court uses a
presumption against preemption to resolve any difficulties in determining
this intent.5 Finally, the Court considers this presumption against
preemption heightened whenever preemption would encroach upon a
state's traditional police powers.52 The Court failed to articulate clearly
how to apply these presumptions to common law claims absent clear
congressional language. This uncertainty has serious implications for
FIFRA, a federal statute, which, like the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette Acts,
43. Id. at 2619.
44. Id. at 2620-21 (concluding that the term "state law" encompasses common law as well as
statutes and regulations).
45. Id. at 2620-25. With each claim, the plurality inquired, in light of the "strong presumption
against preemption," whether the legal duty underlying the claim constituted a "requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health." Id. at 2621.
46. Id. at 2625. The Court permitted claims under three remaining theories to proceed. These
conclusions were based on a detailed analysis of the legal duty imposed by each state law cause of
action. If the plurality equated the underlying duty with the "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]"
proscribed by the statute, then it deemed the claim preempted. Id. at 2621-25.
47. Id. at 2638 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (predicting that the decision would "fill the
law books for years to come"); see also id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Id. at 2625-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
49. Id. at 2627.
50. See supra notes 6-7, 39 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 17-18, 41 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 19-29, 41 and accompanying text.
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raises difficult questions about Congress's intent to preempt state
common law remedies.
B. Regulation and the Role of the States Under FIFRA
In 1972, Congress enacted sweeping amendments to the 1947 Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.5 3  The 1972 amendments
strengthened the Act's regulatory structure while shifting its policy focus
from promotion of efficient agricultural use to protection of human
health and the environment.5 4 Today, FIFRA prohibits the distribution or
sale of any pesticide not registered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).5 The EPA has adopted labeling requirements pursuant
to FIFRA that specify the background color, placement, and prominence
required of warnings on registered pesticides and that include numerous
directives on the warnings' content. 6 However, neither FIFRA nor EPA
regulations mandate the specific language required on a given label, but
rather set a general standard of adequacy. 7 FIFRA ultimately leaves it to
manufacturers to compose the labels' language.5
Like many other federal environmental laws,59 FIFRA does not
expressly provide for private damage remedies for injuries caused by the
substance it regulates."0 Further, no court has read FIFRA to contain an
implied private right of action to recover damages for injuries caused by
53. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972). Passage followed years of congressional hearings
prompted by the public concern over unchecked pesticide use. See H.R. REP. No. 939, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3474, 3475-76. See generally Michael T.
Olexa, Pesticide Use and Impact: FIFRA and Related Regulatory Issues, 68 N.D. L. REV. 445,
445-46 (1992).
54. See S. REP. No. 970, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092,
4093 (claiming that the legislation responded to the adverse impact of pesticides on human health
and the environment); S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3993 (citing protection of "man and his environment" as FIFRA's purpose); 3
WILLAAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONmENTAL LAW, PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES § 5.3, at
42 (1988) (noting that the 1972 Act marked the first FIFRA amendments in which environmental
interests played a significant role).
55. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(a) (,Vest 1980).
56. See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1992).
57. See id. Where the EPA determines a pesticide to be inadequately labeled after registration,
FIFRA subjects manufacturers of pesticides to civil and criminal penalties. See RODGERS, supra
note 54, § 5.24, at 314-19.
58. See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1993); The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902-6992k (West 1990 & Supp.
1993).
60. See RODGERS, supra note 54, § 5.7, at 92.
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registered pesticides.6' The federal common law similarly offers no
remedy to plaintiffs seeking damages from manufacturers of registered
pesticides. 62  Damages from the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act63 also appear largely unavailable.' Thus, plaintiffs seeking
compensation for injuries caused by a registered pesticide must rely on
state common law. However, judicial acceptance of preemption defenses
has raised serious questions about the viability of this only remaining
avenue to compensation.
Problems in determining FIFRA's preemptive scope stem from
section 136v, a "uniformity" provision added in 1972 to preempt certain
state labeling requirements.65  Section 136v's statutory language,
legislative history, and judicial interpretation offer varying degrees of
support for the claim that Congress did not intend the section to preempt
state law claims.
1. Section 136v: Statutory Language and Legislative History
The 1972 FIFRA amendments explicitly address the allocation of
pesticide regulation authority to the states. Section 136v of the Act
provides in part:
(a) A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if and to the
extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by
this subchapter.
(b) Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter.66
61. See Inre "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987,991-92 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
no implied right of action under FIFRA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); see also Kelley v.
Butz, 404 F. Supp. 925, 940 (W.D. Mich. 1975); People for Envtl. Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp.
589, 592 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
62. See "Agent Orange" Litig., 635 F.2d at 995 n.14 (noting that FIFRA "is certainly an
insufficient basis for a displacement of the entire body of state product liability law'); see also City
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding the detailed regulatory scheme adopted by
Congress as Clean Water Act amendments to preempt federal common law nuisance actions).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 1976 & Supp. 1993).
64. See RODGERS, supra note 54, § 5.7, at 93-95.
65. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136v(a)-(b) (West 1980).
66. Id.
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Nothing in the statute's language indicates whether this limitation on
state labeling authority is confined to positive enactments or whether
section 136v preempts state common law as well.
Much of section 136v's published legislative history merely restates
the provision's language. 67 Although the legislative history emphasizes
that Congress was striving to preempt state authority with regard to
labeling and packaging,68 the reports do not indicate whether Congress
intended "state authority" to include common law actions and remedies.69
2. Section 136v: Lower Court Interpretation
Courts interpreting section 136v have reached opposing conclusions
on the section's preemptive scope. Some state courts and perhaps the
majority of federal district courts have followed Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co.7" by refusing to find that FIFRA preempts state common
law claims. In early 1993, however, three federal circuit court decisions
cited Cipollone while upholding FIFRA preemption defenses to common
law tort actions.
In Ferebee, the first federal appeals court to address FIFRA
preemption held that state failure to warn claims were neither expressly
nor impliedly preempted.71  Relying on a presumption against
preemption,72 the Ferebee court first concluded that FIFRA did not state
with the requisite clarity an intent to expressly preempt state common
law damage actions." The court also disposed of the manufacturer's
implied preemption arguments by concluding that state claims neither
made compliance with FIFRA impossible nor prevented accomplishment
67. See S. REP. No. 838, supra note 54, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4021 (stating that
subsection (a) is intended to leave to the states the authority to impose stricter regulation on pesticide
use); S. REP. No. 970, supra note 54, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4128 ("Subsection (b)
preempts any... labeling or packaging requirements differing from such requirements under the
Act.").
68. H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971). But see S. REP. No. 970, supra note 54,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4128 ("Generally the intent of [section 136v] is to leave to the
States the authority to impose stricter regulation on pesticides use than that required under the Act.").
69. See generally NATIONAL AGRIC. CHEM. ASS'N, FEDERAL ENVTL. PESTICIDE CONTROL ACT
OF 1972, A COMPILATION OF THE STATuTE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 205-23 (1972).
70. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
71. Id. at 1539-43.
72. Id. at 1542 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
73. Id. at 1542.
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of FIFRA's goals.74 Cases after Ferebee elaborated on its rationales for
rejecting implied preemption defenses.' However, most decisions
between Ferebee and Cipollone finding no preemption dismissed the
possibility of express preemption without complete analysis.76
Decisions since Cipollone remain split in their conclusions about
FIFRA's preemptive reach. While most courts have followed
Cipollone's command and confined their analysis to the expressly
preemptive scope of section 136v, 77 they have continued to give the
provision divergent constructions. Cases like Burke v. Dow Chemical
Co.7 18 cite Cipollone for the proposition that FIFRA does not preempt
state law tort actions.79 Some of these courts hold section 136v's
preemptive language to be indistinguishable from the language of the
1965 Act declared non-preemptive in Cipollone.8" Other courts uphold
the state claim by focusing on the broad grant of state power in the
savings clause of section 136v(a) and on Cipollone's command to
presume validity."
A second group of lower courts cite Cipollone for the proposition that
FIFRA does expressly preempt all or some state law causes of action.82
In 1993, four circuits have joined this line of cases by holding that
FIFRA expressly preempts certain state law claims. 'In King v. E.I. du
74. Id. at 1542-43. The court founded this implied preemption analysis on the premise that a
manufacturer found liable in tort for failure to warn would not be required to change the label (as he
or she would be required to do under FIFRA), but instead could choose to continue to sell the
chemical with the same label and to pay damages to those injured as a result. Id. at 1542. Cf. supra
note 29.
75. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197-99 (N.D. IIl. 1988); Cox v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
76. See, e.g., Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Mont. 1991).
77. E.g., Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364,370 (7th Cir. 1993); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co.,
797 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.
Mont. 1992); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So. 2d 131 (Fla. App. 1993). But see Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 937-38 (Nev. 1992) (holding that FIFRA impliedly, but not
expressly, preempts state tort claims based on failure to adequately label), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1944 (1993); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. App. 1992); Burge v. Jones,
No. B-92-022, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21208, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1992).
78. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
79. Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1131; see also Couture, 804 F. Supp. 1298; Soli v. Harvest States
Coop., No. A3-89-77 (D.N.D. 1992); Brennan, 613 So. 2d 131.
80. See, e.g., Couture, 804 F. Supp. at 1302.
81. See, e.g., Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1140.
82. See, e.g., Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 (D. N.H. 1993); Casper v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wa. 1992).
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Pont de Nemours & Co.,83 the First Circuit purported to rely on
Cipollone in holding that FIFRA preempted the plaintiffs' state law
claims based on a failure to warn.84 In Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc.,85 the
Seventh Circuit held that FIFRA preempted state failure to warn claims
based on negligence or strict liability.86 The court in Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.87 concluded that,
although the words employed in FIFRA's preemption provision are
different from those in the 1969 Act at issue in Cipollone, their effect is
the same. FIFRA therefore preempted all state law failure to warn
claims.88 The court in Papas v. Upjohn Co.89 relied on Congress's use of
the word "requirements" in section 136v(b) to hold that FIFRA
preempted state law negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty
claims premised on a failure to warn.90
II. FIFRA DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIMS
Courts that continue to hold that FIFRA preempts state common law
claims misapply Cipollone. Despite the confusing distribution of votes,
the Supreme Court's Cipollone opinions contain several unmistakable
directives. Seven justices agreed that courts analyzing statutes with
explicit preemption provisions must not look beyond the language of the
provision to infer preemption.9 These same seven justices also agreed
that a court must construe the language of such a provision in light of a
strong presumption against preemption.92  Courts must settle any
ambiguity in the language against preemption, especially where a state's
authority to enforce its police powers is involved.93
83. 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 16809 (Ist Cir. July 7, 1993).
84. Id. at *10.
85. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 371 (finding that "not even the mqst dedicated hair-splitter could distinguish" section
136v(b) from section 5 of the 1969 Act).
87. 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993).
88. Id. at 1179.
89. 985 F.2d 516 (1 lth Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at518.
91. See supra text accompanying note 40; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625
(1992) (Blackanun, J., concurring in part IIl of the plurality opinion).
92. See supra text accompanying note 41; Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part III of the plurality opinion).
93. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part III of the plurality opinion). A different alignment of six justices apparently
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Courts finding preemption of state common law claims also
misconstrue Congress's intent in enacting FIFRA and disregard
important federalism and due process concerns. This disregard has
devastating results for plaintiffs denied all relief for their injuries. The
effect on sensitive federal/state relations and Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence may prove no less destructive.
A. FIFRA Does Not Impliedly Preempt State Common Law Claims
The Cipollone Court's clearest command is that a court construing a
federal statute that contains an explicit preemption provision must
confine its analysis to an interpretation of that provision. 4  Courts
therefore may not interpret statutes with express preemption provisions
to impliedly preempt state law.9" FIFRA contains such an express
preemption section.96 Section 136v, like section 5 in the 1965 and 1969
Acts analyzed in Cipollone, provides a sufficiently reliable "indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority"t 7 to foreclose the
need for implied preemption analysis. Therefore, any zourt that bases its
finding of FIFRA preemption on an implied preemption analysis
necessarily contradicts Cipollone.98
Despite this relatively clear command, some courts have continued to
analyze FIFRA preemption defenses as if they raise questions of implied
preemption.99  Courts must reject implied preemption defenses to
rejected the notion that a stricter showing of intent is required for preemption of state common law
claims than for preemption of states' positive enactments. Id. at 2620 ("it is difficult to say that
[common law] actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions"); id. at 2634 (Scalia, J.,
concurring with much of part V of the plurality opinion). But see id. at 2618 (Stevens, J.) (finding
no inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common law damages actions).
94. Id. at 2618. This command is arguably also the decision's only urexpected statement. See
generally Cipollone Frustrating but Pro-Plaintiff, Law Professor Tells ATLA Convention Session,
TOXICS L. REP., July 29, 1992, at 278; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV.
163,355 (1992).
95. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct at 2618; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
96. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136v(a)-(b) (West 1980).
97. See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505,
1190 (1978)).
98. The Court no doubt recognized this when it vacated and remanded in light of Cipollone the
two circuit court cases which had held FIFRA to impliedly preempt state tort actions. See supra
notes 87, 89; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 356 (1992).
99. See supra note 77.
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common law claims and confine their FIFRA preemption analyses to the
express preemption inquiry employed by seven justices in Cipollone.
B. FIFRA Does Not Expressly Preempt State Common Law Claims
Cipollone reaffirms that express preemption requires clear evidence
that Congress manifested an intent to preempt."0 In addition, a court
interpreting an ambiguous preemption provision must employ a
presumption against preemption when attempting to interpret Congress's
intent to preempt state police powers.10' Neither the plain language nor
legislative history of section 136v evince the level of intent necessary to
overcome Cipollone's presumption and thereby find express preemption.
1. Section 136v's Plain Language Does Not Support Preemption
Statutory construction is necessarily the primary task of any court
engaging in express preemption analysis. The Cipollone plurality found
that Congress drafted section 5(b) of the 1965 Act narrowly enough to
preserve state common law claims. 02  Courts deciding FIFRA
preemption defenses to common law claims should construe section
136v(b) much as the Cipollone Court read section 5(b) of the 1965 Act
and therefore hold FIFRA non-preemptive of state common law. On the
other hand, the 1969 Act is distinguishable from section 136v, and the
detailed analysis employed by the Cipollone plurality to measure its
preemptive scope is not applicable to a FIFRA preemption defense.
As it did through the 1965 Cigarette Act, Congress speaks "precisely
and narrowly"'0 3 when it preempts state positive enactments in section
136v(b). Nothing in the plain language of section 136v(b) suggests that
Congress intended to do anything other than to prevent state legislatures
and regulatory agencies from imposing additional form or content
labeling requirements on pesticide manufacturers. Unlike other statutes'
preemption provisions, section 136v(b) makes no reference to FIFRA's
effect on state common law remedies.' 4 In fact, by prohibiting only
"labeling or packaging" requirements, section 136v(b) may encroach less
100. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
103. See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
104. See Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (noting this
omission and declining to find express preemption). See also supra note 22 for examples of federal
statutes making explicit reference to preempted common law.
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on state regulatory power than does the 1965 Act's prohibition on
statements in "advertising."1 5
Arguably, section 136v's language is ambiguous on its face.
However, tort claims, since they involve a state's exercise of its police
powers through the common law, are subject to Cipollone's strong
presumption against preemption."16 Courts therefore must resolve any
ambiguity in favor of preservation of the state common law claim. The
language of section 136v(b) does not express the "clear and manifest
purpose" necessary to rebut the presumption against preemption. Several
lower courts have properly used similar reasoning to equate section
136v(b) with the 1965 Act and thus deny preemption defenses." 7
Congress's use of the phrase "requirements for labeling or packaging"
in section 136v(b) does not compel a conclusion that FIFRA preempts
state common law actions. Pesticide manufacturers and other proponents
of FIFRA preemption argue that by prohibiting state "requirements,"
Congress clearly expressed its intent to preempt certain failure to warn
and misrepresentation claims.'0 8 Several post-Cipollone courts have
accepted manufacturers' arguments and concluded that the word
"requirement" in the 1969 Act was dispositive in leading the Cipollone
Court to hold that the 1969 Act preempts such claims. 9 These courts
have refused to distinguish between the "requirement" language in the
1969 Act and the "requirements" language in section 136v(b) and
therefore have equated the preemptive force of FIFRA with the 1969
Act. 10
The Cipollone plurality did partially rest its distinction between the
1965 and 1969 Acts on the change in language from "[n]o statement...
shall be required" to "no requirement.., shall be imposed.' However,
105. See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (accepting a
version of this argument).
106. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., Couture v. Dow Chem. Co., 804 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D. Mont. 1992); cf Burke, 797
F. Supp. at 1140 ("FIFRA lies somewhere in between the 1965 and 1969 cijarette laws').
108. See, e.g., Mary Pat Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express Federal Preemption: Where is it After
Cipollone?, 59 DEF. COuNS. J., 491, 497 (1992); Sheila L. Birnbaum & Gary E. Crawford, How
Cipollone Affects Other Industries, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 20; Recent Case, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 966 (1993).
109. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993); King v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Me. 1992), affd, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 16809 (1st
Cir. July 7, 1993).
110. See, e.g., King, 806 F. Supp. at 1032.
111. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2619 (1992) (finding the modified
language to be "much broader").
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courts that focus their analyses on the meaning of "requirement" ignore
Cipollone's command to construe individual preemptive words in their
textual and legislative context."1 Viewing section 136v(b) in context, a
court could not ignore the savings clause in section 136v(a). This
subsection reserves to the states the expansive power to regulate the sale
or use of registered pesticides.1 As the Ferebee court noted, Congress
would be unlikely to prohibit state courts from compensating victims of
dangerous pesticides while leaving the state the power to ban the
pesticide altogether."4
Read in its textual context, FIFRA's language is also distinguishable
from that in the 1969 Act because section 136v(b) refers only to
"requirements" rather than to the "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" the
Cipollone plurality interpreted broadly." 5  Additionally, Congress
omitted from section 136v(b) any reference to "State law," which the
Cipollone plurality found broad enough in the 1969 Act to include
common law claims."
6
Finally, courts construing the language of section 136v(b) must regard
with some caution the Cipollone plurality's finding of preemption by the
1969 Act. The Court based this finding on questionable distinctions in
meaning between the 1965 and 1969 Acts. The five concurring and
dissenting Cipollone justices criticized the plurality's willingness to find
meaningful differences between the two cigarette laws."7 At least three
of these five believed that the 1969 Act's language no more clearly or
manifestly exhibited an intent to preempt than did its predecessor." 8
This criticism is warranted for two reasons. First, the plurality ignores its
own announced presumption by finding preemption." 9  Second,
preemption is antithetical to the federalism and due process concerns
112. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2608, n.16 (criticizing Justice Scalia's "apparent meaning" reading
of the preemption sections for artificially severing the words from their context).
113. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(a) (West 1980).
114. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984).
115. For the plurality's views on the significance of the word "prohibition," see Cipollone, 112 S.
Ct. at 2620.
116. Id. at 2620-21. But see id. at 2627 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
117. Id. at 2627 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); cf. id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting). In addition, the briefs submitted by both parties contended that the 1969 Act did not
materially alter the preemptive sweep of federal cigarette law. Id. at 2619.
118. Id. at 2627 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
119. See id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting (with satisfaction) that the
plurality seems to ignore its own announced presumption when applying preemption doctrine to the
1969 Act).
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discussed below. The Cipollone plurality should have accepted Justice
Blackmun's arguments that a statute as ambiguous as the 1969 Act could
not preempt state common law. It is unlikely that a majority of the Court
would extend the plurality holding regarding the 1969 Act and read
FIFRA's section 136v(b) to preempt state common law claims.
2. Section 136v s Legislative History Does Not Support Preemption
The House and Senate Reports accompanying section 136v likewise
offer no evidence of clear and manifest congressional intent for FIFRA
to preempt state common law. The scant legislative history of section
136v merely reflects a desire to allow states to impose stricter use
requirements on pesticides, but makes no mention of intent to displace
state law claims. 2 If anything, preemption of state common law claims
counteracts Congress's expressed desire to protect "man and his
environment" through FIFRA.1
21
In addition, the regulatory context in which Congress amended FIFRA
supports a narrow reading of its preemption provisions. Congress
amended FIFRA in 1972 partially in response to state statutes imposing
diverse labeling requirements on pesticides." FIFRA therefore
established a comprehensive regulatory scheme that displaced state
pesticide legislation. There is no indication that Congress was
responding to the imposition of state common law duties when it enacted
section 136v(b). Therefore, as the Cipollone plurality noted with regard
to the 1965 Cigarette Act," the regulatory backdrop to section 136v
does not support a finding of preemption.
Congress must clearly express its intent to displace state common law
claims. FIFRA, like the 1965 Cigarette Act, lacks this requisite intent.
Courts construing FIFRA in light of the traditional presumption against
preemption should conclude that it neither impliedly nor expressly
preempts any state common law tort actions. In addition, preservation of
state common law claims is the only conclusion entirely consistent with
prevailing notions of federalism and the Fifth Amendment.
120. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
122. See Hearings on the Fed. Pesticide Control Act of 1971 Before he House Agric. Comm.,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971) (noting that 48 states had administrative pesticide registration
programs).
123. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct at 2619.
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C. Permitting FIFRA To Preempt State Common Law Disregards
Important Federalism Concerns
Current concepts of federalism support the strong presumption against
preemption and the preservation of state common law claims against
pesticide manufacturers. The Court's shifting preemption presumptions
may reflect individual justices' opinions about constitutional federalism
and the role of the states rather than illuminating a consistent doctrinal
framework. ' 24
Historically, Supreme Court preemption decisions have demonstrated
varying attitudes toward federalism. 125 Since the early 1970s, however,
the Court has appeared reluctant to use preemption doctrine to strike
down state laws.126  The heightened presumption of validity afforded
state police power regulations and common law duties 27 provides
evidence that the current Court emphasizes the independent authority of
states to regulate themselves. 2  The Court's recent reluctance to infer
preemption in ambiguous cases can also be explained with reference to
the seminal federalism case Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority. 29  By requiring explicit expressions of congressional intent
before holding FIFRA preemptive, courts can avoid assuming an activist
role in delineating the boundaries of state sovereignty and thus can
remain faithful to Garcia.
30
It may be impossible to reconcile the positions of individual justices in
Cipollone with this federalism-based preemption theory. Justice
Blackmun authored the Cipollone opinion which would have granted the
states the most leeway in preserving their common law authority.'3 ' Yet
124. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 355 (2d ed. 1991); Bratton, supra
note 13, at 623-24.
125. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
128. The Court also fosters state independence through narrow construction of congressional
language in other contexts. See Ataseadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)
(requiring "unmistakably clear" language to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute).
129. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia recognized that the states occupy a special position in the
constitutional system, but that Congress and the political process are the proper arbiters to ensure
that the federal government does not promulgate laws unduly burdening the states. Id. at 556.
130. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-25, at 480. But see Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption
and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, U. PA. L. REV. 121, 177 (1985) (finding it unlikely that
the Court which decided Garcia would hold a federal statute preempting state common law violative
of the Tenth Amendment).
131. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, who have
been most ardent in their support for states' rights in the federal
scheme, 132 all refused to join the Blackmun opinion. This refusal may
suggest that the justices could not set aside their resenations about some
of the underlying state law claims in order to reach a decision more
consistent with their views on federalism. It is unclear whether these
justices would be equally hostile toward state law claims against
pesticide manufacturers.
Federalism is not the only constitutional concept which counsels
restraint to courts deciding whether state common law claims are
preempted. Courts must also consider the implications of the Due
Process and Takings Clauses before they can validly infer that Congress
has removed all remedies for a harm actionable under state common law.
D. Permitting FIFRA To Preempt State Common Law Disregards Fifth
Amendment Concerns
The Supreme Court has traditionally been most reluctant to find
preemption of state common law actions when invalidation would
deprive victims of all remedies for tortious conduct.1 3 This reluctance
may be explained in part as an effort to avoid the more difficult question
of whether Congress may deprive citizens of all damage remedies
without running afoul of the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment.
134
An act of Congress that deprives citizens of all avenues for monetary
redress for injury may constitute a deprivation of liberty or property
implicating these clauses in any one of three ways. First, it is possible
that common law remedies constitute the type of liberty or property
interest offered procedural protection by the Fifth Amendment.'35 The
Court has long held, however, that legislatures may pass generally
132. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Cv. 1344 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
(holding federalism to render the Sherman Act inapplicable to the states).
133. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
134. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
135. See Glicksman, supra note 130, at 179-80; Richard B. Stewart & Cass It. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1310 n.479 (1982) (arguing that the
government's refusal to offer procedural protective mechanisms raises substantive due process
questions).
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applicable laws affecting these interests without affording procedural
safeguards beyond those specifically required by the Constitution.136 It is
therefore extremely unlikely that interpreting FIFRA to preempt state
law claims would raise important procedural due process concerns.
More serious concerns may arise, however, under the guise of
substantive due process.
A number of Supreme Court opinions have indicated that Congress
may not abrogate certain "core" common law rights without either
showing a compelling necessity or providing for alternative remedies.137
Unlike statutes that the Court has found preemptive of common law
remedies,'38 FIFRA provides no alternative remedy for consumers or
others injured by pesticides.'39 It is also unlikely that a court would find
that protecting pesticide manufacturers from state law compensatory suit
is a compelling necessity. It is nevertheless unclear whether the right to
be compensated for injuries from pesticides is the sort of "core" common
law right Justice Marshall and others saw as inviolable. However, the
Court may be seeking to avoid addressing the application of this doctrine
by adopting a more restrictive view of preemption in cases in which
preemption would eliminate all remedies. 40
Finally, the Constitution may protect state common law remedies from
uncompensated taking. The common law generally functions as a
baseline for determining the forms of private property to be protected
under the takings clause. Recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence
has focused on "expectations" and "absolute deprivation" as
prerequisites to a compensation requirement.' 4 ' By preempting state
136. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); STONE ET AL.,
supra note 124, at 1009.
137. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) (expressing doubt whether "a
state might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of 'due process of law' suddenly set
aside all common-law rules respecting liability... without providing a reasonably just substitute').
But see, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (dicta)
(professing uncertainty as to whether due process in fact requires legislatively enacted compensation
schemes to duplicate common law recovery or to provide a substitute remedy).
138. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (preempting the
common law nuisance remedies available in the plaintiff's home state where the common law of the
point source state is available); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state common law governing labor
disputes preempted where federal law provided for administrative adjudicative procedure).
139. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
140. See Glicksman, supra note 130, at 179-82.
141. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992); see also Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (concluding that property interests in claims against Iran
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common law tort actions, Congress would be defeating absolutely state
citizens' reasonable expectations of compensation for injuries caused by
pesticides. Thus, the takings clause may be relevant whenever a court
construes FIFRA to preempt state common law.
A claim that the Fifth Amendment proscribes courts from interpreting
FIFRA to preempt state law actions is highly speculative. However,
when coupled with the paucity of expressed congressional intent to
preempt and the federalism concerns discussed above, the Fifth
Amendment arguments raised here counsel courts to exercise extreme
caution before finding state claims preempted.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress did not enact FIFRA to provide blanket amnesty for
pesticide manufacturers who breach state common law duties. Courts
holding that section 136v preempts state common law misconstrue
Congress's intent in enacting FIFRA and misapply the preemption
doctrine articulated in Cipollone. Nothing in FIFRA's language or
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to deprive those
injured by pesticides of state common law remedies. Cipollone
reinforces the strong presumption against preemption of state common
law claims applicable where there is no explicit congressional intent to
preempt. Constitutional jurisprudence, federalism, and due process
concerns all testify to the strength of this presumption in favor of state
law claims. Nevertheless, courts continue to deny pesticide-injured
plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue common law claims. Courts must not
read Cipollone to prevent them from interpreting section 136v(b) as it
was intended: a narrow preemption of state positive enactments. In the
interests of certainty and clarity, the Supreme Court should adopt the
"clear statement" standard proposed by the Blackmun concurrence in
Cipollone. Courts must not read federal statutes to foreclose common
law remedies absent a clear, explicit statement of congressional intent to
do so.
were too revocable, contingent, and subordinate to support a constitutional claim for compensation);
TRIBE, supra note 5, § 9-1, at 587-88 (noting that takings jurisprudence is based on a model of
settled expectations).
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